Which countries banned 5G — and why?

Which countries banned 5G (or banned specific 5G equipment vendors) and why? This guide explains which governments restricted 5G infrastructure, the reasons behind those decisions (security, geopolitics, health debates), and what it means for operators and consumers.

Very few countries have banned 5G service outright. What most governments did was restrict or ban specific vendors (primarily Huawei and ZTE) from supplying core 5G network equipment because of national-security and supply-chain concerns. Notable countries that have imposed such bans or legal restrictions include the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Sweden, several Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), and a number of EU members that applied “high-risk supplier” rules. Germany has announced a phased removal of Chinese components. These measures were taken mainly over espionage, supply-chain control and geopolitical concerns, and in some cases following corruption or trust concerns connected to vendors.

What “banned 5G” usually means

When people ask “Which countries banned 5G?” 

1. A ban on the rollout of 5G service (i.e., no 5G networks allowed) — extremely rare and practically non-existent at a national level. Most countries want the economic benefits of 5G: faster mobile broadband, industrial IoT, smart cities.

2. A ban or restriction on particular equipment suppliers (most commonly Chinese vendors such as Huawei and ZTE) from building or supplying parts of 5G networks. This is the common case: nations keep 5G itself but limit who can provide critical infrastructure. The rest of this article focuses on that second — and far more common — situation.

Which countries restricted or banned specific 5G vendors?

Below are categories of countries and examples of the actions they took.

Countries that implemented clear bans or strong restrictions

• United Kingdom, United States, Australia: early leaders in restricting Huawei from critical parts of 5G networks; the US also restricted sales and components via export controls and sanctions. The UK moved from limited use to a full removal timetable in 2020. The US never relied on Huawei equipment in the same way but has led diplomatic and regulatory pressure to isolate suppliers considered “high risk.”

• Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania: several European countries explicitly prohibited Huawei and ZTE from supplying key 5G components, citing security intelligence and national-security assessments. Sweden, for example, ordered removal of certain Chinese equipment already installed by a set deadline.

• Germany: rather than an immediate blanket ban, Germany adopted a phased approach — restricting Chinese vendors from core elements of networks and setting timelines for removal of certain components, with full phase-out targets. This reflects a balancing act between security concerns and economic/industrial ties.

• Several EU members (collectively): over the past few years about a dozen EU countries used national legal powers to label certain suppliers “high-risk” and impose procurement bans or phase-out plans — a trend coordinated by EU guidance on telecom security. Euronews and industry trackers have reported that more than ten EU states imposed such measures.

Countries that avoided formal bans

Many countries opted not to ban vendors outright, instead imposing certifications, audits, or procurement conditions — or leaving the decision to operators. Some markets remained dependent on Chinese equipment because of price and availability. An EU survey in 2025 noted many member states had not yet committed to cutting dependence on Chinese suppliers.

Why governments restricted vendors rather than banning 5G itself

There are three main reasons governments targeted suppliers rather than the 5G standard:

1. National security and espionage fears

5G networks carry massive amounts of sensitive data and can connect critical infrastructure. Governments argued that equipment from companies subject to extrajudicial influence by foreign states might be used for espionage, sabotage or to create hidden backdoors. Intelligence assessments in several countries pointed to unacceptable risk levels for certain suppliers. This national-security rationale is the single most cited reason.

2. Geopolitics and alliance pressure

The US government pushed allied countries to adopt strict rules on suppliers it considered high-risk. Those diplomatic and trade pressures — combined with alliance coordination on critical infrastructure resilience — nudged many governments toward restrictions. For some nations, aligning with allies’ security norms became a diplomatic priority.

3. Supply-chain resilience, corruption and trust

Beyond overt espionage worries, governments cited concerns about supply-chain transparency, vendor ties to foreign governments, and even corruption investigations or scandals involving suppliers. High-profile probes and arrests connected to lobbying and alleged bribery have eroded trust in some vendors — prompting stricter rules. Recent investigations into vendor conduct in Europe have reinforced calls for exclusions or stricter oversight.

How bans are implemented in practice

Countries have used a variety of legal and regulatory tools, often together:

• Procurement rules: block “high-risk” suppliers from public tenders or award processes for critical infrastructure.

• Licencing & security vetting: require operators to show network resilience and supplier transparency; deny approvals if high-risk vendors are critical to the design.

• Phase-out timelines: where equipment is already in use, governments order removal over several years (to manage cost and service continuity).

• Export controls and sanctions: restrict the vendor’s access to certain components (used heavily by the US).

This variety explains why the situation is not simply “banned” vs “allowed” — it’s a spectrum from complete exclusion to tight regulation with transition periods.

Who is affected — operators, consumers, and suppliers

• Mobile network operators (MNOs): face replacement costs, potential delays and complexity in sourcing alternative vendors (Ericsson, Nokia, Samsung, NEC, Fujitsu are commonly cited alternatives).

• Consumers & businesses: short-term disruptions can arise if networks are re-engineered; long-term the goal is safer networks, but costs could slow roll-outs or increase consumer prices.

• Equipment suppliers (targeted vendors): lose market access and contracts, affecting global revenue and supply-chain relationships.

Recent moves by large operators to remove or replace high-risk equipment in countries with bans show the real operational consequences: operators must balance compliance with continued service and capital expenditure.

Common myths & health concerns — separate from political bans

Some local bans or moratoria in early 5G rollouts were driven by public health fears about radiofrequency exposure. Scientific consensus from international health bodies has not supported claims that 5G frequencies at regulated exposure levels cause novel health harms. The vendor bans discussed in this article were almost always based on security and geopolitical concerns, not on health science. (When health concerns influence local debates, regulators still rely on established exposure standards and reviews.)

What comes next — trends to watch

1. More coordinated rules in alliances: expect tighter coordination among like-minded states on “trusted suppliers” lists and common procurement standards.

2. Phased migrations: countries that set phase-out deadlines (e.g., Germany) will drive the market for replacement equipment and services over the next 3–6 years.

3. Vendor responses: targeted suppliers will increase legal, lobbying and technical measures (source code audits, supply-chain transparency) to retain or restore market access.

4. Economic tradeoffs: some countries will increasingly weigh costs of remediation and economic ties to suppliers against security demands — resulting in divergent national approaches.

Bottom line — simple takeaways for readers

• Very few nations banned 5G service outright. Most actions were bans or restrictions on particular suppliers (mainly Huawei and ZTE).

• The driving reasons are national security, geopolitics, and trust/supply-chain concerns, not the wireless standard itself.

• The outcome is a complex patchwork: some countries fully exclude some vendors, others apply audits and transition plans, and many still use mixed suppliers under supervision.